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ABSTRACT
During the past five decades, the US Navy has successfully 
operated a number of nuclear thermal propulsion systems with the 
characteristics similar to those required for long duration, nuclear 
powered, space missions. If nuclear reactor's are to be utilized for 
space propulsion, they will embody many characteristics such, as size, 
mobility, environmental security, crew safety, and long-duration 
independent-operation capabilities which have already been 
demonstrated by their Navy counterparts. The authors present a brief 
overview of both Project ROVER, NASA's most extensive nuclear 
propulsion program to date, which resulted in a total firing tine of 
1,020 minutes at power levels above 1.0 megawatt, This is contrasted 
with Navy operational nuclear reactor experience for significantly • 
longer periods of time at high average power levels, Technical 
issues central to the operation of Navy nuclear reactors which arc 
directly applicable to nuclear powered , manned, space missions are 
explored. The Navy ' s nearly perfect safety record, enviable 
environmental record, as well as significant design, and operational 
experience achieved during approximately 3 , 800 reactor-years of 
operation make its experience and, corporate opinion both 
authoritative and convincing in nuclear matters while providing a 
data base of extreme value which should not be ignored in the 
development of future space nuclear systems.
INTRODUCTION
The Navy Nuclear Program is an analogue for long!" duration« 
nuclear powered, manned space missions for two predominant reasons. 
The first is the tremendous comparability of goals; correlation of 
data types; similarity of operation; and corresponding power levels 
and temperatures. The second is the Navy's technical expertise in 
nuclear safety, environmental, design and operation issues which 
warrants consideration as a model when developing a space nuclear 
rocket for long duration missions,
BACKGROUND
The US performed significant research in the area of nuclear 
rocketry under a project known as ROVER front 1.955 to 1,973 [1]. 
During this time the country invested. $1,5 billion on the development 
of a nuclear rocket engine known by the acronym NERVA (Nuclear Engine. 
for Rpcket Vehicle Application) [2]. Nuclear rockets* desirability 
stems from two factors. Their operating temperatures are 
characteristically high, andl they are true monopropellant engines.
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Both these items raise the specific impulse (Isp) of nuclear rocket 
engines over their conventional bipropellant chemical rocket 
counterparts. This occurs because the Isp of any rocket engine is 
directly proportional to the square root of the chamber temperature 
and inversely proportional to the average molecular weight of the 
propellant [3].
Project ROVER met or exceeded all established goals and was able 
to complete the design and manufacture of a prototype nuclear rocket 
engine whose physical dimensions are comparable to current Navy 
nuclear reactors. Interestingly, one of the designers is a current 
designer of Navy nuclear reactors—Westinghouse. The experience 
amassed is shown in Fig. 1 [1]. The project was terminated in 1973 
as the space program's priorities shifted. At termination no 
technical barriers existed to the development of a nuclear rocket; 
nevertheless, nuclear propulsion for space applications disappeared 
from the scene [4].
Navy nuclear power traces its beginnings to just prior to WWII. 
Dr. George Pegram, a Columbia University physicist, and Dr. Enrico 
Fermi, a nuclear physicist, submitted a plan for a "fission chamber" 
which would generate steam for a submarine power plant. After WWII 
and the successful completion of the Manhattan Project, the 
destructive uses of this new form of energy were widely known and 
appreciated, or perhaps feared is a better description. Many wished 
to see the awesome capabilities of nuclear energy harnessed for the 
generation of electricity and/or propulsion. Inspired by Jules 
Verne's vision in Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, on the 21st 
of January in 1954, the Nautilus became the world's first nuclear 
powered vessel [5].
In the intervening years the Navy has built ever more advanced 
ships, submarines, and their concomitant reactors. Assuming a plant 
efficiency of 20%, the shaft horsepowers of Navy nuclear ships 
correlate with reactors capable of producing approximately 25 to 500 
megawatts-thermal for extended periods of time. To date, the US Navy 
operates 174 reactors on 144 ships [6], three land based prototypes 
and a moored training ship [7]. The reactors have kept pace 
technologically as evidenced by the solid core nuclear thermal 
propulsion design Advanced Fleet Reactor which is currently 
undergoing tests for ultimate installation in a Seawolf class 
submarine.
THE CLAIM FOR A RELATIONSHIP; THE NAVY ANALOGUE
NASA recognizes the overwhelming advantages of nuclear 
propulsion usage in space and believes that a "broad base of 
government and industry support . . . [has been] developed" to 
conduct such research. Accordingly, NASA established the Nuclear 
Propulsion Project Plan which calls for expanding "on the substantial 
NERVA data base" [8]. In short, data and experience on solid core 
nuclear thermal systems are being assembled to further nuclear 
rocketry development. Notably, the considerable data and experience 
garnered by the US Navy in the area of nuclear thermal propulsion 
remains unmentioned.
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The NERVA data base contains information on 1,020 minutes of 
reactor operation above the 1 MW level (see Fig. 1) , without an 
actual flight test of an engine. By contrast, the Navy has four 
decades of experience with operational solid core nuclear thermal 
systems. Its 180+ reactors make it the largest operator of nuclear 
plants in the US; more importantly, the total operating time 
accumulated is 3,800 reactor-years. More than 95% of this experience 
encompasses mobile systems which traverse the globe under ever 
changing and harsh environmental conditions while maintaining high 
standards of safety and reliability. As a consequence, they are able 
to dock in close contact with the general public and find acceptance 
at 150 ports in 50 countries [6]. Furthermore, three land based 
prototype sites—in Connecticut, New York, and Idaho—and a moored 
training ship in Charleston, SC add daily to this experience. 
Maintenance, overhaul, and sundry reactor servicing work is conducted 
at two private and six government shipyards. Research occurs at two 
Department of Energy laboratories. Two engineering and procurement 
organizations are under the aegis of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion 
Program dealing with some 800 contractors. The Navy's system trains 
approximately 2,400 enlisted (technical) and 250 officer (management) 
personnel a year. Finally, a disposal program exists which has 
shipped 16 reactors to the Hanford, WA reservation with additional 
units scheduled [6].
In addition to extensive experience, the Navy's Nuclear 
Propulsion Program shares a similarity of goals with Project ROVER 
and NASA's current Nuclear Propulsion Project Plan, goals which the 
Navy has met and whose operational results have been documented and 
utilized since the 1950s. Consider the first reactor design goal of 
Project ROVER; namely, the maximization of core exit temperature. In 
nuclear rocketry high exhaust temperatures are to increase the 
specific impulse and thus raise the efficiency of the engine. In 
Navy designs a higher exit temperature results in a greater steam 
temperature and thus a greater plant efficiency. The second goal was 
an increase in the longevity of operation. In rocketry, nuclear 
engines will need to operate for many total hours over a period of 
months, or even years. In Navy systems, longevity is measured by 
total operating times in the thousands of hours over a life cycle of 
15 to 20 years. Such operational longevity has already been achieved 
by a number of reactors currently in use. Moreover, current funded 
research is attempting to stretch reactor lifetimes into the 20-30 
year range, thus making reactor life span identical to the life span 
of the ship for which it is intended. The third goal of the ROVER 
reactor designers was to minimize hydrogen corrosion. In both space 
and naval applications the concern is system integrity. The Navy has 
minimized the hydrogen corrosion problem by proper materials 
selection, chemistry control, and by setting specific operational 
limits. Many of these methods have relevance to space based systems. 
An additional goal is the prevention of fuel breakage due to 
vibrational and thermal stress. In space reactors this is mainly to 
ensure continued operation of the power source. The Navy's concerns 
over such breakage are similar although much expanded as all of its 
reactors operate within the biosphere for long periods of time in 
close proximity to humans, including both crew personnel and the 
general public. Crew safety from the added radiation exposure, due
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to fuel breakage, would be a limiting factor in the self-contained environment of a submarine where the power source could not be shut down without endangering the ship and/or the mission. Also, the environmental impact, subsequent political uproar, and ensuing operational restrictions would be unacceptable. Thus the Navy has adopted intense quality control from "cradle to grave" involving meticulous material selection and manufacturing techniques to minimize the occurrence of fuel breakage [6],
The similarity of the above reactor design objectives has resulted in configurations not unlike one another. Both ROVER and pressurized water reactor (PWR) cores function to transfer energy from the uranium fuel to a working fluid which passes through the core. In the case of the ROVER open loop system this fluid is expanded in a nozzle to extract energy. In a closed loop PWR system the high temperature fluid transfers its energy to a separate secondary fluid to create steam [9].
The overall objectives of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program as outlined before the House Armed Services Committee call for a simple, conservative design with redundancy, self-regulation, and ample safety margins [6]. Moreover, developmental goals currently being investigated under Navy auspices, which will sound familiar to those in the space nuclear rocketry field, include the following:
• to achieve longer life with greater plant reliability and reduced plant size and weight
• to develop and qualify high integrity nuclear fuel
• to qualify various materials through irradiation testing• to refine modeling techniques using expanded supercomputers• to improve corrosion resistance.
The Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program's enormous experience and similarity of goals with the Space Nuclear Propulsion Project Plan proffers much to NASA since the data is on reactors of the type used in nuclear rockets and the data base is extensive.
In acknowledging the need for high specific impulse engines for future space flight, those at NASA considered three main types of rockets: high performance chemical rockets that burn liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, nuclear rockets (gaseous and solid), and various fusion rocket concepts. They concluded the fusion concepts would not be ready before 2020, well beyond Mars mission planner target dates. Also, chemical propulsion systems require the use of aerobraking to keep mission mass within acceptable limits, a technology in its incipient stages though it has been used by Viking and will be used by Galileo. Therefore, "solid and perhaps gas-core nuclear thermal rockets offer some of the best prospects for short trip times on the order of a year or less in the next two decades" [10]. Gas core reactors will require advances in computational fluid dynamics (which is admittedly occurring) but will be difficult to sell to Congress and the general public since, no matter how efficient the design, radioactive fuel and fission by-products will unavoidably appear in the exhaust. Consequently, the solid core nuclear thermal rocket seems to provide the best overall approach and it is exactly this
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type of core the Navy has used from the inception of the nuclear 
program. • ,
From its earliest beginnings the Navy's nuclear program has 
emphasized attention to detail in all facets of operation and has 
demanded the data to support said details. Data which could be made 
available to space reactor designers includes information on initial 
core design, core fabrication techniques and their results after 
extended usage (based on actual expended core examination), reactor 
protection and analysis studies, maintenance requirements, equipment 
reliability, chemistry controls, and the resultant corrosion over a 
period of years, difficulties with control systems and operational 
procedures, etc. This data is sent to NAVSEA 08, commonly known as 
Naval Reactors (NR), via Quarterly Data Reports, Quality Assurance 
documents, Alteration and Improvement programs, and various 
maintenance reports. All of this copious information exists and is 
archived in one form or another within the DOD. This data would 
provide insight to those involved in NASA's Nuclear Propulsion 
Project Plan.
For the Navy nuclear program to claim a useful relationship with 
spaceborne systems, it must share with such space systems the ability 
to operate and survive long-duration independent-operation missions 
which are the mainstay of proposed nuclear rocket engine 
applications. The Navy nuclear submarine fleet has always existed 
for just such operations. Indeed, this long-duration operational 
capability independent of the earth's atmosphere is both the strength 
and the raison d'etre for today's US submarines.
The first nuclear submarine, the USS Nautilus, steamed for 
69,138 miles in two years on a single core, thus beginning a long 
series of proofs regarding the endurance of Navy nuclear systems 
[11]. Today's reactors possess greater thermal output than earlier 
versions and last up to 10 times as long. The Nautilus extended its 
feats by traversing the north polar ice cap (using inertial guidance) 
in 1958. The USS Skate went one better by surfacing at the pole in 
1959. A year later, the USS Triton, independent of all logistical 
support and the earth's atmosphere, circumnavigated the globe in 83 
days and 10 hours [12]. The Triton's limiting factor was the 
endurance of its crew along with its limited food storage, not its 
nuclear power source.
Submarines today operate for months independent of all support, 
including the atmosphere, if need be, with the nuclear reactor 
producing power in the megawatt range continuously and in close 
proximity to its human crew. This operation occurs in the depths of 
the world's oceans as well as under the polar ice caps, areas 
considered by many to be less well known than space. As a single 
example, a smaller percentage of the ocean bottom has been explored 
by man than percentage of lunar surface area has been explored by the 
Apollo astronauts. Maintenance to the reactor during these extended 
periods of operation is nonexistent. In fact, overhaul of the entire 
reactor plant system is required only every 7-10 years with the 
reactor itself and immediate supporting equipment not requiring work 
for the life of the core and/or the ship. In short, the endurance of
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Navy nuclear reactors and associated plants is without parallel, as an examination of the supporting documents will attest.
Finally, the power levels and temperatures are comparablebetween Navy reactors and those which will be utilized in space. Admittedly, a terse look at the output and operating temperatures of the NERVA engines would not support such a claim. However, it is universally recognized nuclear engines will be exoatmospheric due to environmental concerns and their low thrust. The most likely use for such engines involves taking the reactors critical only after they are in space. Such nuclear engines will either have lower total power output than the NERVA engines or longer operating times, either of which would make them akin to Navy nuclear designs.
Operating temperatures of Navy reactors are well below those of nuclear rockets; however, the temperatures considered for reactor protection analysis, i.e., reactor accident studies, are within the operating range of such engines. Furthermore, these temperatures are used by Navy designers when determining fuel and cladding configurations to prevent fuel breakage and thermal stress failures over the life of the reactor. Thus, such reactor designs will account for many of the difficulties faced by today's designers of nuclear rocket engines.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
The US space program has suffered four incidents involving nuclear power [13]. The first incident was on April 21, 1964 when a launch vehicle was destroyed after failing to achieve orbit. This accident released approximately 17,000 curies, increased by 4% the total atmospheric burden of plutonium, and tripled the worldwide inventory of the Pu 238 isotope [14]. The second incident occurred on May 16, 1965 when the US's only space reactor, the SNAP 10A, experienced a voltage regulator failure. The reactor was subsequently boosted to a "Nuclear Safe Orbit" (NSO) to ensure sufficient radioactive decay prior to reentry [13]. The third incident was on May 18, 1968 due to a launch vehicle abort because of erratic rocket behavior shortly after lift-off from Vandenberg Air Force Base. The on board Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) sank off the California coast. The fourth incident involved the Apollo 13 mission as a result of an oxygen tank explosion [15]. The returning lunar module carrying the RTG reentered the atmosphere 122 km above the South Pacific Ocean and was never recovered. The common motif for these space nuclear power incidents is the inability to predict reentry points thus making this energy source a environmental concern for the world. Importantly, designers do not expect the radioactive material to become part of the biosphere and handle such matters in terms of probabilities for reentry and failure of the nuclear components rather than designing with the assumption the material will someday return to Earth.
In the 1960s the US Navy lost two nuclear powered submarines,the Thresher and the Scorpion. Neither resulted from a failure of the nuclear power source. A Naval Court of Inquiry attributed the loss of the 'USS Thresher to a seawater system failure, i.e., a
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flooding casualty. Numerous engineering improvements were instituted 
following this loss, none of which implied flaws in the reactor 
design [16, 17]. The USS Scorpion was lost while traveling alone off 
the coast of the Azores. An explosion of one of the ship's torpedoes 
is the presumed cause [17]. Of significance, differentiating these 
accidents from the above space accidents, no radioactivity was 
released to the environment. In each case, once the wreckage site 
was located, samples were taken of the water and bottom sediment to 
check for radioactivity. None was found shortly after the accidents 
and sampling occurred periodically (in 1977, 1983, and 1986 for 
Thresher; 1979 and 1986 for Scorpion) to ensure the reactors' fuel 
had remained intact [6], It has in both cases and no increase in 
radioactivity has been recorded in the vicinity of the accidents to 
date.
To compare then, after launching 25 nuclear power sources into 
space, four failures have occurred, one which tripled the 
radioactivity of an isotope in the atmosphere [2]. Contrast this 
with 3,800 reactor-years of operation, 65,000,000+ miles steamed 
without a reactor accident, and two failures which released no 
radioactivity to the environment [18]. Additionally, the Navy always 
designs with the understanding its nuclear plants will operate in the 
biosphere and with an appreciation for simple, redundant, self- 
regulating systems which will maintain the Navy's perfect record of 
safety [6],
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
The Navy's effectual environmental program would mitigate public 
opposition such as occurred prior to the launch of Galileo [19]. 
Moreover, the Navy is active in the study of other failures, 
including the Soviets', in order to continually improve the system 
[20]. This system monitored the radiation exposure of 35,525 people 
in 1990 without a single person exceeding legal limits; in fact no 
one involved in the Navy's nuclear program has exceed the legal limit 
since 1967 [21]. Table 1 displays the total personnel monitored by 
year and the range of their doses [21]; note the lowering individual 
exposures. This lowering could be accomplished by increasing the 
number of individuals available to perform the various tasks; 
however, the total man-rem has also decreased over the years giving 
credence to the effectiveness of the Navy's radiological control 
programs and its ability to shield personnel from an operating 
reactor. Figure 2 shows this explicitly [21]; as the number of ships 
has grown, the total man-rem per year has shrunk.
Along with exposure to personnel, the Navy is successful in its 
ability to minimize discharges of liquid wastes and lower the volume 
of solid wastes. The release of gamma radioactivity in liquids 
discharged to all ports and harbors from approximately one hundred 
forty Naval nuclear powered ships and supporting tenders, Naval 
bases, and shipyards, was less than 0.002 curie in 1990 and has been 
since 1971 [22]. Additionally, while the number of ships has 
increased, the total radioactivity level discharged has remained 
constant. The radioactivity released to the open sea (>12 miles from 
shore) by Naval nuclear powered ships is less than 0.4 curies per
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year since 1975 [22]. In the solid wastes area the Navy has driven 
down the volume while raising the number of units.
In laymen's terms, if one person were to drink the entire amount 
of radioactivity discharged into any harbor in any of the last twenty 
years, he would not exceed the annual radiation exposure permitted 
for an individual worker by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
[22], With regards to the open sea, the quantity of 0.4 curie 
released to the open ocean represents an amount less than the 
naturally occurring radioactivity in a cube of seawater approximately 
100 yards on a side [22]. To place the overall picture in 
perspective, if all 174 of the Navy's reactors were considered a 
single reactor and placed on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's list 
of civilian commercial power plants as ranked by the amount of 
radiation legally released to the environment, the Navy would rank in 
the bottom fifth [6].
Finally, and powerfully, the Navy in a report to Congress 
proudly claimed "no member of the general public has received 
measurable radiation exposure as a result of current operation of the 
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program" [22]. Furthermore, it should be 
noted the Navy's nuclear environmental safety record has been 
verified via independent monitoring by the Environmental Protection 
Agency and various states [22]. Additionally, the General Accounting 
Office conducted a review of the environmental, health, and safety 
practices of Navy programs under the control of the Department of 
Energy in 1990, The findings stated all such practices at Naval 
Reactors laboratories and sites contained "no significant 
deficiencies" [6].
DESIGN AND OPERATION
At a Space Transportation Propulsion Technology Symposium at 
Pennsylvania State University in 1990 the key technical issues in 
which experience was desired and technical prowess considered 
requisite were identified as follows: Quality Assurance, Testing 
Strategy, Reliability Analysis, Structural, Vessels and Nozzles, 
Pumps and Valves, Control Systems, Shielding, Hydraulics, and 
Materials [23]. Likewise, a study for the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission on human reliability decried the "lack of data" from 
commercial nuclear power plants which made it difficult to determine 
the experience levels required to minimize errors [24], The report 
stated that even the copious Three Mile Island data was mainly useful 
in determining only the maintenance procedures required to minimize 
errors.
The Navy has significant experience in all the key issue 
areas mentioned above. In the words of the current Director of Naval 
Reactors, the Navy exercises strict control over materials and 
manufacturing processes as well as extensive inspections throughout 
to ensure high quality from initial manufacture to final disposal 
[6]. The operation of Navy nuclear reactors is deliberately labor 
intensive to guarantee maximum operability in wartime situations; as 
a result, the'human reliability data is abundant, experience levels 
are high, and nearly 40 years of refining procedures to minimize
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errors is potentially available for study.
Operation of nuclear power sources invariably requires the use 
of shielding to protect personnel and equipment. The shielding of 
personnel is difficult in space applications due to weight 
constraints and activities such as docking, rendezvous, and Extra 
Vehicular Activity. Shielding experience in the space program tends 
to be centered on an understanding of the space environment and the 
protection of personnel from this environment [25]. Personnel with 
the experience to perform shielding and other space nuclear related 
studies are scarce and not likely to become more abundant in the 
future unless space nuclear engineering education is expanded [26]. 
In summary, what's lacking is hands-on experience and data.
The Navy can provide both. Over the years Navy shielding has 
protected tens of thousands of individuals. Furthermore, the Navy is 
proficient in the handling of radioactive wastes and can guide NASA 
in the design of space nuclear waste disposal systems—an area which 
has received little technical attention [27]. Finally, until 
personnel are available in ample numbers with space nuclear 
engineering experience, Navy nuclear engineering experience is a 
reasonable and logical substitute.
CONCLUSION
Space nuclear reactor designer's goals coincide with those of 
Navy nuclear reactor designers. Navy nuclear systems are 
distinguished for their longevity; long life is requisite for space 
nuclear systems. Independent operation, isolated from a hostile 
environment, is essential for both space and naval missions. Power 
levels and temperatures are comparable between operational naval 
reactors and proposed space reactors. Succinctly, the Naval Nuclear 
Program is analogous to long duration, nuclear powered, manned space 
missions. Moreover, the Navy possesses the design, operational, and 
training experience; nuclear safety and environmental record; and 
reputation in nuclear matters which would make it a valuable partner 
with NASA in the development and deployment of space based nuclear 
propulsion systems. NASA has established a Nuclear Propulsion 
Systems Office to develop a Nuclear Electric Propulsion or Nuclear 
Thermal Propulsion system [28]. This project is a joint NASA/DOE/DOD 
effort and one would hope the Navy's information and experience in 
nuclear matters will be utilized. While much of the data base is 
classified and may require significant effort to obtain, the first 
step is the realization of the relevance of the Navy Nuclear 
Program's information to space nuclear programs* Once this is 
accomplished, the data can be analyzed for its usefulness; then, the 
shape and extent of any resulting NASA/Navy team can be determined. 
Ideally, the Navy and NASA will form a partnership whose purpose 
shall be to take man to the heavens.
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1
1
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
&i*
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
1
14
27
26
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
0
0
• 0
Total 
Peraonnel 
Monitor**!
36
101
122
301
576
1,109
2,711
4,957
7,095
9,442
10,805
12,852
18,982
21,565
24,696
27,718
26,980
26.813
34,108
31,570
16,749
17,997
16,229
20,716
22,403
21,197
21,845
23,608
27,622
27,645
30,106
31,465
33,960
34,699
34,786
35,166
36,052
35,447
Total
6
25
50
60
100
200
375
660
1,312
1,420
1,964
3,421
3,529
3,084
2,463
2,916
3,069
3,261
3,271
3,160
2,142
2,217
2,642
2,812
2,234
1,528
1,494
1,415
1,660
1,B32
1,729
1,549
1,593
1,536
1,422
1,599
1,502
1,309
1977
1976
1979
19SO
1961
1962
1963
1964 
19SS 
1966
1987
1988
1969
1990
1991
Votet Data obtain** fro* eueiaariee rather than directly from original medical 
record*. Total aan~re* was determined by adding actual expoaurei for amch 
individual vonitored by each reporting cowumd during the year. Total nuiqber 
monitored includaa riiitorft to each reporting cowoaad. It ie expected that 
the l*ro« effort to co*pil« comparable »an-rea data from original medical 
records would show differences no greater than five percent.
* Limit in the If aval Nuclear Propulsion Program waa changed to S ran per year 
in 1967.
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REACTOR AND ENGINE SYSTEM 
CUMULATIVE TEST TIME
Cumulative limc-At-powcr during rocket reactor 
testing. Afttr DoWtf 51 Gabriel. "Nucltar Propulsion in ikt 
Siat*it " 1972.
Figure 1
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